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We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map states to lotteries, 
where agents have preferences not only for consequences but also for ‘honesty’. We show 
that in the complete information environments with three or more agents, every social 
choice function is implementable in Nash equilibrium. This is in contrast with the standard 
implementation models where agents have preferences only for consequences and no social 
choice function depending on factors other than agents’ preferences is implementable. We 
show also that in the incomplete information environments with two or more agents, every 
Bayesian incentive compatible social choice function can be implemented in Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium by a mechanism that is universal in the sense that it does not depend on 
the detail of the private signal structure. 
 
Keywords: Preference for Honesty, Normative Social Choice Functions, Implementation, 
Small Fines, Universal Mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
1   The earlier version of this paper corresponds to the old manuscript entitled “Honesty-Proof 
Implementation”. I would like to thank Mr. Daisuke Shimizu for his careful reading. All errors are mine.   2
1. Introduction 
 
We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map states to lotteries 
over the set of pure alternatives where we use only small fines.
2 Real individuals may have 
preferences not only for consequences but also for anything non-consequential such as 
‘honesty’. Based on this fact, this paper will assume that each agent has positive cost for 
dishonest reporting. Several works such as Erard and Feinstein (1994), Alger and Ma 
(2003), and Deneckere and Severinov (2001) examined the case that agents’ ability to 
manipulate information is limited, and demonstrated that including agents who have 
preferences for honesty could significantly alter the model. These works assumed that the 
cost for dishonest reporting is sufficiently large. In contrast, the present paper will allow the 
maximal total cost for dishonest reporting to be as close to zero as possible. 
First of all, we show that in the complete information environments with three or more 
agents, every social choice function is implementable in Nash equilibrium where honest 
reporting is always the unique iteratively undominated strategy profile. This positive result 
is in sharp contrast with the standard implementation models, where every agent has 
preference only for consequences,
 3  as follows. A social choice function is said to be 
normative if it depends on factors other than agents’ preferences for consequences. It has 
been assumed in the standard implementation models with complete information that a 
social choice function is not normative, and therefore, its domain is restricted to the set of 
agents’ preference profiles. In fact, we can easily check that if every agent has preference 
only for consequences, then no normative social choice function is implementable in Nash 
equilibrium.
4 This negative result is valid, even if we replace Nash equilibrium with any 
equilibrium concept with complete information and consider virtual implementation.
5 In 
contrast with the standard implementation models above, the present paper shows that 
whenever each agent has preference for honesty in the marginal way, then every normative 
social choice function is implementable in Nash equilibrium. 
Second, we show that in the incomplete information environments with two or more 
agents, every Bayesian incentive compatible social choice function is implementable in 
                                                 
2  There are excellent surveys on implementation theory such as Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), and 
Maskin and Sjostrom (2002). 
3 Eliaz (2001) took into account factors other than individuals’ preferences for consequences such as 
bounded rationality. The paper by Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) is more closely related to the present 
paper, where agents are allowed to have preference for anything non-consequential. 
4 See Maskin and Sjostrom (2002), for example. Serrano and Vohra (2001) presented an example in 
the economic environments with incomplete information where agents’ preferences are the same 
across states but their initial endowments depend on the state. In their example, every individually 
rational social choice function is non-constant, and therefore, is normative in our sense. 
5 Fix any equilibrium concept arbitrarily, where the set of equilibrium outcomes is assumed to be the 
same between states that have the same preference profiles. Implementability requires the set of 
equilibrium outcomes to equal the value of the social choice function. If the social choice function is 
normative, then there exist two distinct states that have the same preference profile, and therefore, have 
the same set of equilibrium outcomes irrespective of the mechanism construction, but that induces 
different socially desired lotteries. This is a contradiction of implementability.   3
Bayesian Nash equilibrium where honest reporting is the unique Bayesian iteratively 
undominated strategy profile. Of particular importance, the mechanism constructed is 
regarded as being universal in the sense that it does not depend on the detail of the private 
signal structure. Hence, the central planner can construct the mechanism without knowing 
what the true private signal structure is. This point is in sharp contrast with the standard 
implementation models with incomplete information, where a mechanism is tailored to a 
specific situation, and therefore, is difficult to use in practice. 
In the present paper, we will construct mechanisms where each agent makes multiple 
announcements about the state. In this respect, the paper is related to Abreu and 
Matsushima (1992a, 1992b). In contrast with Abreu and Matsushima, however, the present 
paper does not use the device of virtualness originated by Matsushima (1988) and Abreu 
and Sen (1991). Hence, our results are on ‘exact’ implementation as opposed to ‘virtual’, 
and our mechanisms are much simpler than the mechanisms in Abreu and Matsushima for 
this reason.
6 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shows the basic model. Section 3 
investigates the complete information environments and shows that every social choice 
function is implementable in Nash equilibrium. Section 4 investigates the incomplete 
information environments and shows that every Bayesian incentive compatible social 
choice function can be implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium by a universal 
mechanism. 
 
                                                 
6 Abreu and Matsushima (1994) studied exact implementation but used an idea similar to virtualness.   4
2. The Basic Model 
 
Let  } ,..., 1 { n N =  denote the finite set of agents where  2 ≥ n . We will denote  1 1= + n  
and  n = −1 1 . Let Ω  and  A   denote the nonempty and compact sets of states and 





i M M . At every state  Ω ∈ ω , the agents will announce a message profile 
M m m m n ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  and the central planner will decide an alternative  A a∈  and fine each 
agent  N i∈  a nonnegative amount of private goods  ] , 0 [ ε ∈ − i t , where  0 > ε  is the upper 
bound of fines. The resultant utility for each agent  N i∈  is given by  ) , , , ( ω i i i m t a u , where 
we allow each agent to have intrinsic value on which message to be announced. 
A simple lottery is denoted by  ] 1 , 0 [ : → A α , which has the countable support  A ⊂ Γ ) (α  






a . Let ∆ denote the set of all simple lotteries. We assume the expected 
utility hypothesis where the expected utility for agent i at state  Ω ∈ ω  when the central 
planner chooses an alternative according to  ∆ ∈ α  and  fines  agent i  the  amount  i t −  of 




i i i i i i a m t a u m t u ) ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( α ω ω α . A social choice 
function is defined as a mapping from states to simple lotteries and is denoted by 
∆ → Ω : f , where  ) (ω f  is regarded as the socially desired lottery at state ω . We denote 
by F  the set of all social choice functions. A mechanism is defined by  ) , ( x g G = , where 
∆ → M g : ,  N i i x x ∈ = ) ( , and  ] 0 , [ : ε − → M xi  for each  N i∈ . When the agents announce a 
message profile  M m∈ , the central planner will choose an alternative according to the 
lottery  ∆ ∈ ) (m g  and fine each agent  N i∈  the amount  ] , 0 [ ) ( ε ∈ − m xi . 
   5
3. Complete Information 
 
This section considers the situation in which all agents have complete information about the 
state. A message profile  M m∈  is said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game defined by  ) , ( ω G  
if for every  N i∈ , 
) , ), , ( ), , ( ( ) , ), ( ), ( ( ω ω i i i i i i i i i i m m m x m m g u m m x m g u ′ ′ ′ ≥ − −  for all  i i M m ∈ ′ . 
A social choice function  F f ∈  is said to be implemented by a mechanism  ) , ( x g G =  in Nash 
equilibrium if at every state  Ω ∈ ω , there exists a Nash equilibrium in  ) , ( ω G , and every Nash 
equilibrium  M m∈  in  ) , ( ω G  induces the socially desired lottery, i.e., 




i M Ω = , 
where K  is a positive integer. Each agent  N i∈  announces K  elements of Ω at one time. Let 
K
i i i M M M × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × =
1  and  ) ,..., (
1 K
i i i m m m =  where  Ω =
k




i M m ∈ . For every 
} ,..., 1 { K k ∈ , let  ) ,..., ( 1
k
n
k k m m m = . The honest message for each agent  N i∈ at each state 




i i M ∈ = =1 )) ( ( ) ( ω µ ω µ  where  ω ω µ = ) (
k
i  for  all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈ . Let 
N i i ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω µ ω µ  denote the honest message profile. 
We assume 
   3 ≥ n . 
We will specify a mechanism  ) , , (
* ε K f G G =  as follows. Fix a lottery  ∆ ∈ α  arbitrarily. We 
define  ∆ → Ω
n z :  in ways that for every  Ω ∈ ω  and every 
n
n Ω ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1 δ δ δ , 
) ( ) ( ω δ f z =  if  ω δ = i  for at least  1 − n  components of δ , 
and for every 
n Ω ∈ δ , 
α δ = ) ( z  if there exists no such  Ω ∈ ω . 

















 for all  M m∈ . 
For every  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ K k , the central planner will choose an alternative according to the lottery 
) (




, where for every  Ω ∈ ω , 
   ) ( ) ( ω f m z
k =  if  ω =
k
i m  for at least  1 − n  agents, 
and 
   α = ) (
k m z  if there exists no such  Ω ∈ ω . 
For every  N i∈ , we specify  i x  by 








j m m 1 − =  for   6
all  N j∈  and all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k h , 
and 
0 ) ( = m xi  if there exists no such  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ K k . 
Each agent  N i∈  is fined the amount ε  if and only if she is the first to announce a different 
opinion from agent  s i )' 1 ( −  K-th opinion. When the agents announce  ) (ω µ , the central planner 
will choose an alternative according to  ) (ω f  and no agents are fined, i.e., for every  Ω ∈ ω , 
) ( )) ( ( ω ω µ f g = , and  0 )) ( ( = ω µ i x  for all  N i∈ . 
Let } ,..., 0 { ) , ( K m l i i ∈ ω  denote the number of  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  satisfying  ω ≠
k
i m , i.e., the 




t a v m t a u
i i
i i i i i
) , (
) , ( ) , , , (
ω
ω ω − + = , 
where 0 > c
7. Note that  ) , ( ω a vi  represents agent  s i'  preference for consequences, and that 
each agent has preference for honesty in the sense that the cost of reporting each component of her 
message dishonestly is given by 
K
c
. Here, each agent concerns not only whether she announces 
dishonestly but also how often she announces dishonestly amongst her K announcements. 
 
Theorem 1: Suppose 
(1)   ε ω ω
ω
) 1 ( ) , ( ) , ( max
2 ) , , , (
− < ′ −
× Ω × ∈ ′
K a v a v i i
N A i a a
. 
Then, every social choice function  F f ∈  is implemented by  ) , , (
* ε K f G  in Nash equilibrium. 
 





i m =  in the game  ) ), , , ( (
* ω ε K f G , because both  ) (m g  and  ) (m xi  are independent of 
K
i m  and she has preference for honesty.
8 Fix  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ K k  and  M m∈  arbitrarily, where 
ω ω µ = =




i m  for all  N i∈  and all  } , 1 ,..., 1 { K k k − ∈ ′ . 
















′ ′ = ′  for all  } /{ } ,..., 1 { k K k ∈ ′ . 




j m =  for  all  } /{i N j∈ , then, it follows that  ) (m g   is independent of 
k
i m  and 
                                                 
7  We can extend our results to the general case where the cost for dishonest reporting depends on 
Ω × ∈ N i ) , ( ω , i.e., we can replace c with  0 ) ( > ω i c  with no substantial changes. 
8 When agents have no preferences for honesty, we have to use another device such as virtualness, in order 
to incentivize them to make their K-th announcements honestly, which makes implementation of 
normative social choice functions impossible.   7
) ( ) , ( m x m m x i i i i ≥ ′ − , which, together with the fact that agent i   has preference for honesty, 




j m ≠  for some  i j ≠ , 
then it follows that  ε = − ′ − ) ( ) , ( m x m m x i i i i , which, together with the inequality (1), implies that 
agent i has incentive to announce  i m′ instead of  i m , because 
) , ), , ( ), , ( ( ) , ), ( ), ( ( ω ω i i i i i i i i i i m m m t m m g u m m t m g u ′ ′ ′ − − −  
ε ω ω µ ω − −
−







i m z v m z v
K
 
0 ) , ( ) , ( max
1
1
2 ) , , , (
< − ′ −
−
≤
× Ω × ∈ ′
ε ω ω
ω
a v a v
K
i i
N A i a a
. 
The above arguments imply that for every  Ω ∈ ω ,  ) (ω µ   is the unique iteratively 
undominated message profile in  ) ), , , ( (
* ω ε K f G . Hence, we have proved that every social 
choice function  F f ∈  is implemented by  ) , , (
* ε K f G  in Nash equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
 
We must note that for every  0 > ε , there exist a positive integer K   that satisfies the 
inequality (1). Hence, it follows that for every  0 > ε  and every  0 > c , there exists a positive 
integer  K   such that every social choice function  F f ∈   is implemented by the mechanism 
) , , (
* ε K f G  in Nash equilibrium.
9 
  The proof of Theorem 1 shows that for every  Ω ∈ ω , the honest message profile  ) (ω µ  is 
the unique iteratively undominated strategy profile in the game  ) ), , , ( (
* ω ε K f G . This implies 
that  f  is implementable not only in mixed Nash equilibrium but also in iteratively undominated 
strategies. 
  We must note that the construction of the mechanism  ) , , (
* ε K f G , together with the 
inequality (1), does not depend on the cost  0 > c . This implies that, irrespective of how close to 
zero the cost  0 > c  is, the mechanism  ) , , (
* ε K f G  can implement  f  in iteratively undominated 
strategies. 
  A social choice function  F f ∈  is said to be normative if it depends on factors other than 
agents’ preferences for honesty in the sense that there exist  Ω ∈ ω  and  } /{ω ω Ω ∈ ′  such that 
   ) ( ) ( ω ω ′ ≠ f f , 
and for every  N i∈ , 
   d bv v i i + ′ ⋅ = ⋅ ) , ( ) , ( ω ω  for some  0 > b  and some  R d ∈ . 
We must note that if every agent has preference only for consequences, i.e.,  0 = c , then no 
                                                 
9  Deneckere and Severinov (2001) constructed mechanisms in which each agent makes multiple 
announcements. In their paper, the cost for each agent’s making all announcements dishonestly becomes as 
large as possible as the number of her announcements increases. In contrast, the present paper assumes that 
the total cost of each agent’s making all announcements dishonestly is set constant (maybe close to zero) 
irrespective of how many announcements each agent will make.   8
normative social choice function is implementable in Nash equilibrium. This negative result is 
valid, even if we replace Nash equilibrium with any equilibrium concept with complete 
information and consider virtual implementation. In contrast, whenever  0 > c , then we need no 
such restrictions, and therefore, every normative social choice function is implementable in 
iteratively undominated strategies. 
  Besides utilitarian interpersonal utility comparisons, there exist many previous attempts to 
establish various ideas on theoretical foundation of social choice and welfare that are based on 
factors other than individuals’ preferences, such as primary goods originated by John Rawls 
(1971), liberty, functioning, and capabilities originated by Amartya Sen (1982, 1985, 1999), 
compensation and responsibility originated by Ronald Dworkin (1981), and others. With no 
doubt it will be a most substantial ongoing and future research in the social choice theory 
literature to cultivate further the influence of factors other than individuals’ preferences on the 
social welfare judgments.
10 In order to make such non-preference based social choice theories in 
practice, however, individuals must have incentive to announce their reports honestly on these 
non-preference factors as well as their preferences. The present paper is regarded as a first attempt 
to establish affirmative answers to this manipulation problem. 
  We do not need to require every relevant agent to participate in the decision procedure 
described by the mechanism  ) , , (
* ε K f G . All we need to require is that at least three agents who 
have complete information about the state participate in the decision procedure. Hence, we can 
assume 3 = n , even if there exist other individuals who can not participate in the decision 
procedure but whose preferences have influence on which lottery to be socially desired. This 
point is in contrast with the standard implementation models where all relevant individuals must 
participate in the decision procedure. 
 
                                                 
10 For example, see Basu, Pattanaik, and Suzumura (1995), Sen (1999), Suzumura (2002), and others.   9
4. Incomplete Information 
 
This section considers the incomplete information environments. Each agent  N i∈  
receives her private signal  i i Ω ∈ ω  where  i Ω   is the nonempty and finite set of private 





i . This section assumes  2 ≥ n .
11 
A message rule for each agent  N i∈  is defined as a function  i i i M → Ω : η . Let  i Ξ  
denote the set of all message rules for agent i. We denote by  N i i ∈ = ) (η η  a message rule 




i ,  N i i i ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω η ω η , and  } /{ )) ( ( ) ( i N j j j i i ∈ − − = ω η ω η . A private signal 
structure is defined by 
i i N i i i p p Ω ∈ ∈ ⋅ = ω ω , )) | ( (  where  ] 1 , 0 [ : ) | ( → Ω ⋅ −i i i p ω  is  the 
conditional probability function. Let P   denote the set of private signal structures. A 
message rule profile  Ξ ∈ η  is said to be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a mechanism G  
for a private signal structure  P p∈  if for every  N i∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
   ] , | ) ), ( )), ( ( )), ( ( ( [ i i i i i p x g u E ω ω ω η ω η ω η  
   ] , | ) , )), ( , ( )), ( , ( ( [ i i i i i i i i i p m m x m g u E ω ω ω η ω η − − − − ≥  for all  i i M m ∈ , 
where ] , | [ i p E ω ⋅  implies the expected value conditional on p  and  i ω . A social choice 
function  F f ∈   is said to be implemented by a mechanism G  in  Bayesian  Nash 
equilibrium for a private signal structure  P p∈  if there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
in G  for  p , and every Bayesian Nash equilibrium η  in  G  for  p   always induces the 
socially desired lottery, i.e., for every  Ω ∈ ω , 
   ) ( )) ( ( ω ω η f g = , and  0 )) ( ( = ω η i x  for all  N i∈ . 
We specify 
K
i i M Ω =  for all  N i∈ . 
Each agent  N i∈  announces  K  elements  of  i Ω   at one time. Let 
K









i i Ξ ∈ = =1 ) ˆ ( ˆ η η  where  i i
k
i ω ω η = ) ( ˆ  for all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  and all  i i Ω ∈ ω . Let  N i i ∈ = ) ˆ ( ˆ η η  
denote the honest message rule profile. 
Fix a positive integer  } 1 ,..., 1 { ˆ − ∈ K K  and a positive real number  ] , 0 ( ˆ ε ε ∈  arbitrarily. 












= = . 
                                                 
11 This section assumes  3 ≥ n .   10
For every  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ , the central planner will choose an alternative according to the 
lottery ) (
k m f  with probability 
K ˆ
1
. For every  N i∈ , and  M m∈ , 











′ =  for all  N j∈ , all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k h , and all  } ,..., 1 ˆ { K K h + ∈ ′ , 
and 
0 ) ( = m xi  if there exists no such  ) , ( k k ′ . 
Each agent  N i∈   is fined the amount ε ˆ   if and only if she is the first to announce a 
contradictory opinion to what she announces as her last  K K ˆ −  opinions. When the agents 
announce ) ( ˆ ω η , the central planner will choose an alternative according to  ) (ω f  and no 
agents are fined, i.e., for every  Ω ∈ ω , 
) ( )) ( ˆ ( ω ω η f g = , and  0 )) ( ˆ ( = ω η i x  for all  N i∈ . 
Let } ,..., 0 { ) , ( K m q i i i ∈ ω  denote the number of  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  satisfying  i
k
i m ω ≠ . In a 




t a v m t a u
i i i
i i i i i
) , (
) , ( ) , , , (
ω
ω ω − + = . 
 
Theorem 2: Suppose that 












) , ( ) , ( max





a v a v i i
N A i a a
< ′ −
× Ω × ∈ ′
. 
Then, for every  P p∈ , every social choice function  F f ∈   is implemented by 
) , ˆ , ˆ , , ( ˆ c K K f G ε  in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for every  N i∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(4)   c
K
K
p f v E p f v E i i i i i i
ˆ
] , | ) ), , ( ( [ ] , | ) ), ( ( [ − ′ > − ω ω ω ω ω ω ω  for all  i i Ω ∈ ′ ω . 
 




i ω η ω η ≠  for  some 
} ,..., 1 ˆ { K K k + ∈ . Let  i i M m ∈  denote the message for agent i defined by 










i m ω η =  for all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ . 






i ω η ω η
+ ≠  for some  } ,..., 2 ˆ { K K k + ∈ . Then, 
   ε ω η ˆ ) ), ( ( − = −i i i i m x  for all  i i M m − − ∈ .   11
Since  ε ˆ ) ( − ≥ m xi , ) ), ( ( ) ( i i i m g m g − = ω η for all  i i M m − − ∈ , and agent i has preference for 
honesty, it follows that agent i   has incentive to announce  i m  instead  of  ) ( i i ω η . Next, 






i ω η ω η
+ =  for all  } ,..., 2 ˆ { K K k + ∈ . By replacing  i m  with  ) ( i i ω η , we 








ε ω η ˆ ) ), ( ( ) ( − ≥ − −i i i i i m x m x  and  ) ), ( ( ) ( i i i m g m g − = ω η  for all  i i M m − − ∈ , it follows from 
the inequality (2) that agent i has incentive to announce  i m  instead of  ) ( i i ω η . Here, the 
inequality (2) implies that the cost for making the last  K K ˆ −  announcements dishonestly, 
i.e.,  c
K
K K ˆ −
, is larger than the monetary fine ε . This is the driving force of incentivizing 
each agent to reporting honestly from the  th K − + ) 1 ˆ (   component to the  th K −  
announcement. 




i ω η ω η =  for  all  N i∈ , all 
i i Ω ∈ ω , and all  } ,..., 1 ˆ { } 1 ,..., 1 { K K k h + − ∈ U . Fix  N i∈ , and  i i Ω ∈ ω  arbitrarily,  and 




i ω η ω η ≠ . Let  i i M m ∈  denote the message for agent i defined by 










i m ω η =  for all  } /{ } ,..., 1 { k K h∈ . 
Let  i i − − Ω ⊂ Ω ~
 denote the set of private signal profiles  i − ω  for the other agents satisfying 




j ω η ω η ≠  for some  } /{i N j∈ . Note that for every  i i − − Ω ∈
~
ω , 
   ε ω η ˆ )) ( ( − = i x  and  0 )) ( , ( = − − i i i i m x ω η . 
Hence, 
] , | ) ), ( )), ( ( )), ( ( ( [ i i i i i p x g u E ω ω ω η ω η ω η  
] , | ) , )), ( , ( )), ( , ( ( [ i i i i i i i i i i p m m x m g u E ω ω ω η ω η − − − − −  
K
c




i i i i
k
i − − ≤ − − ]} , | ) )), ( , ( ( [ ] , | ) )), ( ( ( [ { ˆ
1
ω ω ω η ω ω ω ω η  
∑
− − Ω ∈
− −
i i
i i i p
~
) | ( ˆ
ω
ω ω ε  
K
c
p f v E p f v E
K
i i i i i
k
i i − − = − ]} , | ) ), ( ( [ ] , | ) ), ), ( ( ( [ { ˆ
1
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω η  
∑







i f v f v




ω ω ω η ω ω η  
) | ( ] ˆ )} )), ( , ( ( ) ), ( ( i i i i
k
i i i i p f v f v ω ω ε ω ω η ω ω ω − − − − − +  
K
c
p f v E p f v E
K
i i i i i
k
i i − − ≤ − ]} , | ) ), ( ( [ ] , | ) ), ), ( ( ( [ { ˆ
1
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω η    12
∑
− − Ω ∈
−
× Ω × ∈ ′
− ′ − +
i i
i i i i i
N A i a a
p a v a v
K ~ ) , , , (





ω ω ε ω ω , 
which is less than zero because of the inequalities (3) and (4). 
  The above arguments imply that η ˆ  is the unique Bayesian iteratively undominated 
message rule profile. Hence, we have proved that  f  is implemented by  ) , ˆ , ˆ , , ( ˆ c K K f G ε  in 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium for  p . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  We must note that for every  0 > c  and every  0 > ε , there exist  ] , 0 ( ˆ ε ε ∈ ,  K , and 
} 1 ,..., 1 { ˆ − ∈ K K  such that the inequalities (2) and (3) hold and 
K
K ˆ
 is close to unity. Hence, 
it follows from Theorem 2 that for every  0 > c  and every  0 > ε , there exist  ] , 0 ( ˆ ε ε ∈ , K , 
and  } 1 ,..., 1 { ˆ − ∈ K K   such that for every  P p∈ , every social choice function  F f ∈  is 
implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium by  ) , ˆ , ˆ , , ( ˆ c K K f G ε  if for every  N i∈  and every 
i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(5)   c p f v E p f v E i i i i i i − ′ > − ] , | ) ), , ( ( [ ] , | ) ), ( ( [ ω ω ω ω ω ω ω  for all  i i Ω ∈ ′ ω . 
Here, the inequalities (5) imply that the social choice function f  is Bayesian incentive 
compatible associated with the cost c  for dishonest reporting. This positive result is in 
contrast with the standard implementation models with incomplete information, where each 
agent has preference only for consequences, i.e.,  0 = c , and Bayesian incentive 
compatibility is necessary but not sufficient for implementation in Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium. This negative result is valid, even if we replace Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
with any other equilibrium concept with incomplete information and consider virtual 
implementation.
12 
The proof of Theorem 2 shows that η ˆ is the unique Bayesian iteratively undominated 
message rule profile in  ) , ˆ , ˆ , , ( ˆ c K K f G ε  for  p . This implies that f  is implementable not 
only in mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium but also in Bayesian iteratively undominated 
strategies. 
  We must note that the mechanism  ) , ˆ , ˆ , , ( ˆ c K K f G ε  is universal in the sense that it 
does not depend on the detail of the private signal structure  P p∈ . This is in contrast with 
the standard implementation models with incomplete information, where the constructed 
mechanisms depend crucially on the fine details of  p , and therefore, might be difficult to 
use in practice. 
A social choice function  F f ∈  is said to be universally implemented by a mechanism 
G  in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if it is implemented by G  in Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
for all private signal structures. 
                                                 
12 See Jackson (1991), Matsushima (1993), Duggan (1997), Serrano and Vohra (2000), and others.   13
 
Theorem 3:  Suppose that the inequalities (2) and (3) hold. Then, every social choice 
function F f ∈   is universally implemented by  ) , ˆ , ˆ , , ( ˆ c K K f G ε  in  Bayesian  Nash 
equilibrium if for every  N i∈  and every  Ω ∈ ω , 
(6)   c
K
K
f v f v i i i i
ˆ
) ), , ( ( ) ), ( ( − ′ > − ω ω ω ω ω  for all  i i Ω ∈ ′ ω . 
 
Proof: The inequalities (6) imply the inequalities (4) for all  P p∈ . Hence, Theorem 2 
implies Theorem 3. 
Q.E.D. 
 
We must note from Theorem 3 and the above arguments that for every  0 > c  and 
every  0 > ε , there exist  ] , 0 ( ˆ ε ε ∈ , K , and  } 1 ,..., 1 { ˆ − ∈ K K  such that every social choice 
function  F f ∈   is universally implemented by  ) , ˆ , ˆ , , ( ˆ c K K f G ε  in  Bayesian  Nash 
equilibrium if for every  N i∈  and every  Ω ∈ ω , 
(7)   c f v f v i i i i − ′ > − ) ), , ( ( ) ), ( ( ω ω ω ω ω  for all  i i Ω ∈ ′ ω . 
Here, the inequalities (7) imply that  f  is ex post incentive compatible with the cost c for 
dishonest reporting, i.e., the honest message rule profile η ˆ  is  an  ex post equilibrium 
originated by Cremer and McLean (1985) in the direct mechanism with no fines. Hence, it 
follows that for every  0 > c , every  0 > ε , and every  F f ∈ , ex post incentive compatibility 
implied by the inequalities (7) is a sufficient condition for implementation in Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium via a universal mechanism in the above sense. 
   14
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